We consider a key exchange procedure whose security is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in a group, and where exponentiation is hidden by a conjugation. We give a platform-dependent cryptanalysis of this protocol. Finally, to take full advantage of this procedure, we propose a group of matrices over a noncommutative ring as platform group.
1.Introduction
The Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is the first published practical solution to the key distribution problem, allowing two parties that have never met to exchange a secret key over an open channel. It uses the cyclic group F * q , where F q is the finite field with q elements. The security of this protocol is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in the group F * q . There are several algorithms for computing discrete logarithms, some of them are subexponential when applied to F * q .
It is important to search for easily implementable groups, for which the DL problem is hard and there is no subexponential time algorithm for computing DL. The group of points over F q of an elliptic curve is such a group. So keeping in mind the above remarks and the fact that F * q = GL 1 (F q ), one can wonder whether the group GL 2 (F q ) of two-by-two invertible matrices or more generally the group GL n (F q ), which admit a"natural" normal form, can be used for a Diffie-Hellman protocol and whether there is some advantage in using them. Remark 1.1 Let us fix a matrix X ∈ GL n (F q ). Knowing X and a power X a , is it easy to find a? The first point is that knowing X, one can compute det(X) ∈ F * q (the determinant of X), and also det(X a ) = (det(X)) a . In this way, the DL problem in matrix groups reduces to the DL problem in F * q .
One can avoid this difficulty by choosing a matrix X such that det(X) = 1, but then by computing eigenvalues of X and of X a ( possibly in an extension of the base field), and using the fact that the latter are the former in the power of a, one reduces once again the DL problem to the one in some extension of F * q .
So there is no advantage of considering the DL problem in the group of invertible matrices over a finite field, and more generally over a finite commutative ring.
We wish to mention that the group of matrices over a finite field as above was first proposed as a platform group for Diffie-Hellman key exchange in [12] , and was cryptanalysed using eigenvalues and Jordan form in [10] . Note that in this proposition the noncommutative structure of GL n (F q ) is not used.
In [2] , a protocol using noncommutative (semi) groups in cryptography was proposed. A platform using braid groups and the same idea was proposed in [9] . Also another platform using matrix algebra was discussed in [16] . The protocol we use in section 3 is based on the same idea. It uses conjugation and exponentiation together for its security. A platform for this protocol using braid groups was first proposed in [14] and another one using an F q -algebra in [11] . We shall give a cryptanalysis of these two platforms in section 3, by reducing the problem to the discrete logarithm problem over some finite field .
The semigroup of matrices over a commutative ring was considered in [8] for an authentication protocol, but its security is based on the difficulty of the conjugacy search problem and not on the discrete logarithm one. In fact the authors consider matrices over a somehow complicated ring, namely the ring of N-truncated polynomials in k variables to make the conjugacy search problem infeasible.
To avoid the reduction of DL problem to the one over finite fields mentioned in the above remark, which stems from the special features of (semi)-group matrices over finite fields (namely determinant and properties of eigenvalues), we can consider matrices over noncommutative finite rings. Group algebras F q [G] , where G is a noncommutative finite group are examples of such rings. The simplest example of such group algebras is the group algebra of the group of permutations of three elements, which is easily implementable. We can then consider two-by-two invertible matrices over such a group algebra. In the next section, one considers matrix groups over noncommutative rings and investigate whether the previously mentioned reduction (remark 1.1) in the case of DL problem in the group matrices over finite fields can happen or not.
2. Quasideterminants, noncommutative determinants, eigenvalues...
Since the invention of quaternions, there has been attempts to define a notion of determinant of a matrix with noncommutative entries. Here one can mention great names such as Cayley, Study, Moore, Wedderburn, Heyting and Richardson, Ore, Dieudonné, Berezin, who all considered such noncommutative determinants. In most of the cases, these noncommutative determinants are rational functions of the entries. The most recent and most general attempt (1991) is due to I. Gelfand and Retakh. It proved to be very effective in many areas of noncommutative algebra. In what follows we recall some definitions and results from [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] . See also [15] , for a generalization of Dieudonné determinant.
Given a square matrix A of size n, with entries in a noncommutative ring R, we note A ij the matrix obtained from A by deleting the ith row and the jth column. We also note by r . We have |A| ij ∈ R and, of course, this quasideterminant exists if the (n−1)-by-(n−1) matrix A ij is invertible. So, for a matrix of size n, there are n 2 quasideterminants. Remark 2.1: Even in the commutative case, a quasideterminant is equal not to a determinant, but to the ratio of two determinants, namely, |A| ij = (−1)
.
Using quasideterminants, one defines a noncommutative determinant which gives the determinant (modulo a sign) in the commutative case: Let I = {i 1 , i 2 , ..., i n } and J = {j 1 , j 2 , ..., j n } be two orderings of the set {1, 2, 3, ..., n}. Note by
..j k the matrix obtained from A by deleting the lines i 1 , i 2 , ..., i k and the columns j 1 , j 2 , ..., j k . Then one defines the noncommutative determinant of the n-by-n matrix A by: There is still another definition of a noncommutative determinant [4] , motivated by representation theory, and giving the determinant in the commutative case. This noncommutative determinant is an elementary symmetric function of the noncommutative eigenvalues of A. We do not give this definition here.
To summarize, there is an active area of noncommutative algebra dealing with noncommutative determinants, noncommutative eigenvalues, ... From our cryptographic point of view, we only need to make sure that there is no formula reducing the DL problem in the group of matrices with noncommutative entries to the DL problem in the ring of coefficients. To the best of our knowledge, there is no way to relate the determinant of a matrix or its eigenvalues to the corresponding determinant and eigenvalues of a power of this matrix in the noncommutative case.
A Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
We consider the following protocol, which is based on the general idea of [2] . The platform proposed in [9] using braid groups is based on the same idea; in the latter case, the security is based on the conjugacy search problem, whereas in the following, one uses the discrete logarithm and the conjugacy search problem together. Suppose G is a noncommutative group and H 1 and H 2 two subgroups of G such that every element of H 1 commutes with every element of H 2 . Here G, H 1 , H 2 and an element X ∈ G of some high order n will be public data. Alice and Bob will use these data to exchange a key.
Alice selects at random a secret integer a ∈ {2, 3, ..., n − 1} and a secret element T ∈ H 1 (T X = XT ); she computes T X a T −1 and sends it to Bob.
Bob selects at random a secret integer b ∈ {2, 3, ..., n − 1} and a secret element
and sends it to Alice.
Alice computes (T
Bob computes (T X a T −1 ) b = T X ab T −1 and he conjugates it by his secret element T ′ to obtain T ′ T X ab T −1 T ′−1 which is the same as what Alice obtained due to the commutativity T T ′ = T ′ T .
We immediately see that the choice of a matrix group over a finite field (and to some extent over a commutative ring) as a platform group for this protocol is not a good one. In fact, Remark 1.1 in the introduction about the reduction of the DL problem from matrix groups to the same problem over some extension of the base field remains valid. Let λ be an eigenvalue of T X a T −1 . One has det(T X a T −1 − λid) = 0, so det(T (X a − λid)T −1 ) = 0. Then, by the multiplicative property of determinant, we get det(X a − λid) = 0 and λ is an eigenvalue of X a and is equal to some eigenvalue of X to the power a. So choosing a matrix group over a finite field as a platform group offers no advantage. Furthermore, taking the underlying multiplicative group of an algebra as platform group does not provide any advantage either, as using representation theory one can reduce the problem to the one over matrices and then to the discrete logarithm over some finite field.
This protocol was first used in [14] in the context of braid groups. In the paper the authors consider a modified irreducible Burau type representation of a braid group and apply this protocol at the representation level to the matrices over some finite field. By what we said previously this is not a good choice and can be reduced to the DL problem over some extension of the field. The same protocol was used in [11] , by taking as the platform group the multiplicative group of a noncommutative algebra of dimension four over a finite field. By taking the regular representation of this algebra we can transfer the scheme to the level of matrices and then reduce it to the DL problem in some extension of the finite field. In [13] this protocol is implemented as a software for smartphones using (5 × 5) matrix groups over a finite field, and its performance is compared to other implementations using finite fields or elliptic curves. The result of this comparison is that this protocol is largely more performant than those using finite fields or elliptic curves. As mentioned before, due to the reduction to the case of discrete logarithm over a finite field, the performance of this protocol using matrix groups over a finite field must not be so different from the one over a finite field. So, to take the best advantage of this protocol, we propose to choose as a platform group the group of matrices over a noncommutative rings, namely we consider two by two matrices over the group algebra of the symetric group S 3 , which we denote by G = GL 2 (F q [S 3 ]) where S 3 is the group of permutations of three elements. Here X will be an element of GL 2 (F q [S 3 ]) and we fix
which is a commutative subgroup of GL 2 (F q [S 3 ]). In fact H is a maximal torus of GL 2 (F q ).
ElGamal encryption
Suppose that Alice is the owner of the public key data,
of order n and H = H 1 = H 2 as above. Suppose also that Alice has selected a secret integer a and a secret matrix T ∈ H, and made T X a T −1 public. Bob can encrypt a message M intended for Alice, as follows: Bob selects a random integer b ∈ {2, 3, .., n − 2}, and a matrix T ′ ∈ H; he computes T T ′ X ab T −1 T ′−1 as explained in the precedent section. Bob determines a symmetric encryption key t based on T T ′ X ab T −1 T ′−1 (in a way he agreed upon with Alice). Bob uses an agreed upon symmetric encryption method with key t to encrypt M, resulting in the encryption E. Bob sends (T ′ X b T ′−1 , E) to Alice. Receiving these data, Alice computes T T ′ X ab T −1 T ′−1 , as in the previous section; she derives from this the symmetric encryption key t; she uses the agreed upon symmetric encryption method with key t to decrypt E, and finds M.
Remark 3.1.1 The ElGamal encryption as explained above is an hybrid version of ElGamal's encryption. In the textbook ElGamal encryption, we can take the message
Alice computes (T T
′ X ab T −1 T ′−1 ) −1 and by multiplying at the left with the second data, she finds M. See also [1].
Choice of parameters and security
Owing to the similarity between the protocol we use and the one proposed in the context of braid groups [9] , one may ask if the same kind of attacks as in the braid groups can be applied in our context.
We remind that the security of braid-based cryptography relies on the difficulty of the conjugacy search problem. The problem is as follows: Knowing an element X and a conjugate T XT −1 , is it easy to find T ? In other words, we know an element and some conjugate of it and one tries to find a conjugating element T . One of the main attacks against these procedures is to search T not in the whole conjugacy class of X, but in some characteristic part of it. The second kind of attack is to use some probabilistic research in the conjugacy class of X. The third one is to use linear representations of braid groups to reduce the problem to the one in a matrix group, which is easy to solve. See [3] for details.
The main difference between our approach and those using braid groups is that, in our case, X is publicly known, but the conjugacy class which is involved is that of X a , which is not known, so all the above attacks are useless in our case.
As we mentioned before (section 2), specific features of the group of invertible matrices with noncommutative entries cannot be used to attack our protocol.
As for the existing algorithms computing discret logarithms, such as "Baby Step, Giant Step", or the Pollard rho algorithm, they cannot be applied directly and without modification to our protocol, because in these algorithms one is supposed to know an element and some power of it; in our case X ∈ G is known but X a is hidden due to the conjugation by a secret matrix T .
Algorithm 4.1 We propose the following algorithm (an adaptation of the Baby Step Giant
Step algorithm) for computing the secret keys. Let n be the order of X. So knowing X and Y = T X a T −1 , we want to compute the secret keys a , T and the exchanged key T T ′ X ab T ′−1 T −1 . 1) For k = 1 to n compute X k , and put the sorted result in a table.
2) For x, y ∈ F q such that x 2 −y 2 = 0 put T x,y = x y y x ; then compute T x,y Y T −1
x,y , and compare it to the table of step (1).
3) If, for some k 0 and some T x 0 ,y 0 , one has
a and conjugate it by T −1 x 0 ,y 0 to obtain the exchanged secret key.
As for the complexity of Algorithm 4.1, we have O(n) group operations in the first step. Then, in the second step, we have O(q 2 ) group operations and O(nln(n)) comparaisons. So, assuming that a comparaison is much faster than a group operation, we conclude that altogether the algorithmic cost is O(max(n, q 2 )).
Taking into account the above values, we propose to take |F q | ≃ 2 40 and the matrix X of GL 2 (F q [S 3 ] to be of order ≥ 2 80 .
We propose to generate the invertible matrices X as follows. First, we observe that every matrix a c 0 b with a and b invertible in F q [S 3 ] and no condition on c is invertible, with in-
. Also every matrix a 0 c b satisfying the same conditions is invertible, with inverse a
. Then, we can see that every matrix of the form X =
) and no condition on b, c is invertible as well. Indeed, we observe that P XQ = Id where P and Q are the invertible matrices P = 1 0 −cu −1 1
and
. By multiplying invertible matrices of the types above, one can obtain a number of invertible matrices.
We now determine |GL 2 (F q [S 3 ])|, which is helpful for computing the order of elements. 
Conclusion
Matrix groups admit a natural normal form, making them easy to use for cryptography. Over finite fields special properties of matrix groups such as determinant and eigenvalues can be used to develop attacks against the protocol investigated in this paper. So, in any cryptographic protocol using matrix groups, one has first to verify that the above properties cannot be used to defeat the system. By using matrix groups over a noncommutative ring such as the group algebra of a finite group (for instance F q [S n ]), we can avoid such attacks.
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